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This paper presents an overview of graphical models that can handle imprecision in prob-
ability values. The paper ﬁrst reviews basic concepts and presents a brief historical account of
the ﬁeld. The main characteristics of the credal network model are then discussed, as this
model has received considerable attention in the literature.
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Geographic, biologic, economic, and many other kinds of relations are routinely
depicted with graphs. Consequently it should not be surprising that graphs are also
employed to represent interactions among random variables: for example, Bayesian
networks and Markov random ﬁelds use graph-theoretic concepts to represent com-
plex statistical situations. Perhaps the most profound contribution of graph-theo-
retic (‘‘graphical’’) methods in probabilistic modeling has been a way of thinking
that emphasizes locality of interactions as the key to compactness and eﬃciency.
Graphs form a language; this language is visually pleasant and computationally eﬃ-
cient. What else could be asked for?0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2004.10.003
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of graphical models. Imprecise probabilities and graphs have been married quite a
few times, either because one wishes to extend the success of standard graphical
models to the realm of imprecise probabilities, or because one thinks that standard
graphical models are unrealistic unless they can handle imprecision in probability
values. This paper oﬀers an overview of graphical models aimed at imprecise prob-
abilities, with the primary intent to be introductory and didactic—at the expense of
formality and technical detail. Some historical perspective is provided in Section 3,
but no comprehensive review is attempted. The strategy here is to focus on a parti-
cular type of model, credal networks, and to use this model to convey the central
challenges and promises of graphical techniques.2. Graphical models for precise probabilities
The purpose of this section is to ﬁx key terminology and to indicate the scope of
the paper. A graph is an object consisting of a set of nodes and a set of edges connect-
ing nodes [7]. In this paper we focus on graphical models that have nodes/edges asso-
ciated with statistical objects.
A Bayesian network consists of a directed acyclic graph where each node is asso-
ciated with a random variable and with conditional probability distributions [79].
(Note that here we start using ‘‘node’’ and ‘‘variable’’ interchangeably.) Edges indi-
cate direct dependency, and are often embodied with a causal interpretation: an edge
from X to Y suggests that X somehow causes Y [80,95]. An inﬂuence diagram is sim-
ilar to a Bayesian network, but is equipped with decision and value nodes; the pur-
pose of an inﬂuence diagram is to represent sequential decision problems in
compact form [24,63]. A Markov random ﬁeld consists of an undirected graph where
each clique (completely connected group of nodes) is associated with a non-negative
function, called a potential [67]. Other models combine directed, undirected, bidirec-
tional and dotted edges [27,28,70,80,95]. In Markov Decision Processes, each node
represents a state, and the process can transit from a state to the next state by a num-
ber of paths (the edges) [11,82]. Typically these graphical models are used either to
produce inferences (the computation of the posterior probability for one or more
events) or to produce conﬁgurations of variables that maximize some appropriate
quantity.
Central to all these graphical models are Markov properties. A Markov property
relates graphical entities to probabilistic independence relations. For example, take
the graph in Fig. 1. What is the ‘‘Bayesian network’’ interpretation for this graph?
The answer is given by the Markov property for Bayesian networks: the non-descen-Fig. 1. A simple directed acyclic graph.
F.G. Cozman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 39 (2005) 167–184 169dant non-parents of a node are independent of the node conditional on the nodes
parents. For instance, the graph in Fig. 1 imposes independence of X and Z condi-
tional on Y. Markov random ﬁelds, Markov Decision Processes, and other graphical
models display diﬀerent Markov properties.
In short, we have that: (1) graphs provide a compact and eﬃcient language to rep-
resent multivariate statistical models; and (2) the interpretation of a graphical model
is given by a Markov property.3. Graphical models for imprecise probabilities
Probabilities are often stated through assessments such as P(A) 6 1/2, P(B) = 3/10,
P(A [ B) P 4/5, for eventsA and B. One of the recurring problems in probability the-
ory is how to handle a collection of assessments that can be satisﬁed by more than one
probability measure. The answer already articulated by Boole [10] is that the assess-
ments imply probability intervals over events. For example, P(A) 6 1/2 and
P(A [ B) P 4/5 imply P(B) 2 [3/10,1]. Such a formulation has been revisited and re-
ﬁned by many researchers, among which de Finetti [43] and other statisticians of the
‘‘de Finettian school’’ [13], andHailperin [58] andNilsson (who gave it the name prob-
abilistic logic) [77]. The rules of probabilistic logic have often been depicted through
graph fragments [47]; however these graph fragments have functioned only as visual
representations. A similar situation has occurred in expert systems like MYCIN [94]
or INFERNO [83], where rules requiring manipulation of imprecise beliefs have been
often represented graphically, but have not inherited any semantics from the graphical
forms.
The development of Bayesian networks during the 1980s suggested new ways to
combine uncertain reasoning with graphs. Algorithms for inference in polytree-
shaped Bayesian networks [79] inspired a number of inﬂuential papers on hierarchi-
cal hypothesis spaces. To understand the idea, consider Fig. 2, which presents a piece
of medical knowledge discussed by Gordon and Shortliﬀe [55]. Each node in this ﬁg-
ure represents an event that is decomposed into its children nodes. A degree of sup-
port can be attributed to any node, indicating how much that node is believed to be
true. Gordon and Shortliﬀe proposed a representation of interval-valued degrees of
support based on belief functions, and a mechanism for combining belief functions
based on Dempster rule. Shafer, Shenoy and co-workers have developed message-
passing algorithms for combination of belief functions in hierarchical hypothesesFig. 2. Graphical model discussed by Gordon and Shortliﬀe [55]; nodes represent events, and leaves are
exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
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[3,68].
Several other graphical models for imprecise probabilities surfaced around 1990.
Fertig and Breese derived approximate inference algorithms for inﬂuence diagrams
associated with lower bounds on probability values [12,46]. Van der Gaag started
from a diﬀerent mix: instead of directed acyclic graphs and probability intervals,
she adopted undirected models and general linear constraints on probability values
[99]—the result of these choices is a linear programming algorithm that can eﬃ-
ciently produce inferences. A diﬀerent scheme was proposed by Wellman: instead
of probability values, one should use qualitative notions such as ‘‘occurrence of
event A increases the probability of event B’’ [106]. The result is a qualitative Bayes-
ian network; research on this topic remains strong since its inception [8]. Yet another
proposal for representation of imprecise probabilistic knowledge is the ‘‘order-of-
magnitude’’ approach, where probabilities are represented up to ordinal or inﬁnites-
imal values [49,96]. Qualitative and ordinal probabilities also received graphical
formulations [40,85], and elicitation procedures that can handle both quantitative
and qualitative assessments have also generated steady interest [44,86].
As a short digression, note that during the 1980s and 1990s many concepts of con-
ditioning for probability intervals and 2-monotone capacities were formulated and
discussed in the literature [22,60]. Quite a few of those concepts faced technical
and semantic diﬃculties, and this situation probably contributed to delays in the the-
ory of graphical models for imprecise probability. Clearly, it is diﬃcult to construct a
graphical model when the underlying uncertainty calculus cannot properly handle
conditioning.
The beginning of the 1990s witnessed the ﬁrst publications explicitly combining
general sets of probability measures and directed acyclic graphs [20,97]. At that time
the ﬁeld of robust Bayesian statistics was actively using sets of probability measures
to represent perturbations in statistical models [5]. Diﬃculties that plagued proba-
bility intervals and 2-monotone capacities were found not to apply to sets of proba-
bility measures, and a rather complete theory of imprecise probabilities, that
extensively employed sets of probability measures, was published by Walley in
1991 [102]. These developments led to a marriage between sets of probabilities and
directed acyclic graphs that has been strong ever since. Section 4 discusses the theory
of directed acyclic graphs associated with sets of probability measures—structures
often referred to as credal networks.
A few additional research eﬀorts deserve mention in this brief historical account,
at the risk of missing some relevant contributions. Chrisman [23] has presented a
quite original model for undirected graphs associated with probability intervals.
Lukasiewicz [73], Thone et al. [98] and Luo et al. [74] have presented graphical mod-
els that extend probabilistic logic. Several of those algorithmic developments are dis-
cussed in an overview paper by Cano and Moral [18]; their detailed review is quite
complementary to the present paper. Relatively little attention has been given to
graphical models that incorporate decisions and imprecise probabilities—however
there has been recent eﬀort by Danielson et al. [39] to process decision trees
and inﬂuence diagrams associated with linear constraints on probability values
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recent development is the construction of classiﬁcation trees with sets of probabilities
[1].
Finally, the class of imprecise Markov Decision Processes should be mentioned.
An imprecise Markov Decision Process is obtained when the probabilistic require-
ments on Markov Decision Processes are relaxed: the transition from current to next
state is modeled by a set of probability measures or by probability intervals. Work
on imprecise Markov Decision Processes started in the seventies [87] and has been
revisited a few times since then [9,52,61,107,108]. Up to now there have not been
‘‘graphical imprecise Markov Decision Processes’’ in the literature.4. Credal networks
A credal network is a graphical model that associates nodes and variables with
sets of probability measures. An informal way to convey the content of a credal net-
work is to think about it as a representation for a set of Bayesian networks over a ﬁxed
set of variables. Note that there is no commitment as to whether one of these Bayes-
ian networks is the ‘‘correct’’ one.
The most obvious motivation for credal networks is to have them as ‘‘relaxed’’
Bayesian networks. In a Bayesian network, the Markov property implies that we
must specify a (unique) probability distribution for every variable conditional on
any conﬁguration of the variables parents. This may be a diﬃcult process for several
reasons. Existing beliefs may be incomplete or vague, or there may be no resources to
gather/process enough information so as to reach a precise probability assessment.
Even if experimental data are available, one may not be comfortable with point esti-
mates and may select probability intervals as estimates. It may also be the case that a
group of individuals is responsible for specifying probability values, and these indi-
viduals cannot agree on precise probability values. Hence we may want to specify a
set of probability distributions for every variable conditional on the variables
parents. When we do so, we obtain a credal network.
More than just ‘‘relaxed’’ Bayesian networks, credal networks oﬀer a knowledge
representation tool. Most people do use probability intervals and qualitative rela-
tionships in their dealings with uncertainty; few people can assess probability values
up to their third decimal place. Moreover, most people can handle disagreeing
sources of probabilistic assessments, even when such a mix does not lead to a single
probability measure. People can handle imprecise probabilities; a ﬂexible and general
knowledge representation tool for artiﬁcial intelligence applications should do just as
much.
It is interesting at this point to present examples of credal networks, leaving a
more detailed deﬁnition of concepts to Section 5. Two artiﬁcial examples are dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section, so as to illustrate the basic elements and
the representational power of credal networks. Readers interested in real applica-
tions may consult the work of Antonucci et al. [4] for a complex credal network con-
structed both from expert opinions and data, and the work of Zaﬀalon et al. [115] for
Fig. 3. An example credal network.
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Consider ﬁrst the graph in Fig. 3. All variables are Boolean; a variable X has val-
ues x and :x. Suppose the network in Fig. 3 was created by several experts, reﬂecting
a multitude of views and beliefs.
An expert was hired to establish the probabilities for variables A, B and E. The
expert ﬁrst declared that A was ‘‘probable’’ while B was ‘‘between improbable and
impossible.’’ Using Renooijs verbal scale [86] as guidance, these verbal statements
were translated to P(A = a) 2 [0.75,0.85] and P(B = b) 2 [0.0,0.15]. The expert then
applied the conventions of qualitative networks to p(EjA,B) [106], as indicated by
the plus and minus signs in Fig. 3. That is, the expert indicated that
P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ a;B ¼ bÞ 6 P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ bÞ;
P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ a;B ¼ :bÞ 6 P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ :bÞ;
P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ a;B ¼ bÞ P P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ a;B ¼ :bÞ;
P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ bÞ P P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ :bÞ:
The expert could also state the precise assessment P(E = ejA = a,B = b) = 0.4. The
largest set of functions P(EjA,B) that satisfy these qualitative and numeric assess-
ments has seven vertices. Each vertex is speciﬁed by a triplet containing values
P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ a;B ¼ :bÞ, P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ bÞ, and P ðE ¼ ejA ¼ :a;B ¼ :bÞ; the
seven vertices are given by the following triplets: [0, 0.4,0]; [0,1,0]; [0.4,1,0.4];
[0, 0.4,0.4]; [0.4,0.4, 0.4]; [0,1,1]; [0.4,1,1].
A second expert was hired to examine variables F, I and L. The expert assessed
P(F = f) = 0.2. The expert then took a Noisy-OR function [79] to model p(IjE,F),
with ‘‘link’’ probabilities P ðI ¼ ijE ¼ e; F ¼ :f Þ ¼ 0:9 and P ðI ¼ ijE ¼ :e; F ¼
f Þ ¼ 0:8. The expert decided to have a ‘‘leak’’ probability, but could not assess its
value precisely, and adopted an interval leak probability of [0.1,0.2]. To assess
p(LjI), the expert consulted a database with experiments, but she was unsure about
priors for the estimates, and took an Imprecise Dirichlet Model [6,104,113] over
them, producing interval estimates for P(L = ljI = i) and P ðL ¼ ljI ¼ :iÞ. The expert
obtained P(L = ljI = i) 2 [0.5,0.6] and P ðL ¼ ljI ¼ :iÞ 2 ½0:4; 0:5	.
A group of three experts was then hired to model the remaining variables. The
experts used a large database to obtain precise estimates for P(HjD,E), P(JjG),
and P(KjG,H), shown in Fig. 3. No data was available for C, D, and G. After much
discussion, the experts produced assessments P(C = c) P 0.4, PðC ¼ :cÞ P 0:5,
P(D = d) P 0.2, and PðD ¼ :dÞ P 0:7. The experts did not agree at all on
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order), the opinions of the experts were:
P ðG ¼ gjC ¼ c;D ¼ dÞ ¼ ½0:2; 0:3; 0:4	;
P ðG ¼ gjC ¼ c;D ¼ :dÞ ¼ ½0:7; 0:6; 0:5	;
P ðG ¼ gjC ¼ :c;D ¼ dÞ ¼ ½1; 1; 1	;
P ðG ¼ gjC ¼ :c;D ¼ :dÞ ¼ ½0:8; 0:9; 0:8	:
The experts recommended that, for every possible combination of probability val-
ues within the elicited bounds and sets, the joint distribution should be produced
using the Markov condition in the graph of Fig. 3. Consider a few inferences with
this network (an inference here is the computation of a tight interval containing
all possible values for the probability of an event). 1 For example, P ðD ¼ djA ¼
:a; F ¼ f ;K ¼ kÞ 2 ½0:17; 0:45	. Note that inferences do not assume more informa-
tion than available in the model, but they do yield valuable information—we can
say that P ðD ¼ djA ¼ :a; F ¼ f ;K ¼ kÞ is smaller than 0.5 if we need to make a deci-
sion concerning this value.
The important point in this example is that the credal network summarizes a large
variety of assessments, translating diﬀerent kinds of beliefs into a uniform and
understandable language. Qualitative, verbal, empirical and subjective information
are all organized into a single structure.
Consider a second example, taken from Cozman et al. [34]. The example is based
on Jaegers version of the ‘‘Holmes problem’’, a situation that mixes ﬁrst-order logic
constructs with probabilities [66]. The story is this. If a person v lives in LA, then she
may (probabilistically) sound the alarm, depending on whether there is a burglary
and whether there is an earthquake. If v does not live in LA, then she may (proba-
bilistically) sound the alarm in case there is a burglary. Here v is a universally quan-
tiﬁed variable in a domain V, and the relations alarm(v), lives-in(v,LA),
burglary(v) and earthquake(LA) describe vs situation. To simplify the nota-
tion, denote alarm(v) by Av, lives-in(v,LA) by Lv, burglary(v) by Bv and
earthquake(LA) by E. For each relation Y, either y or :y holds.
Jaeger presents a model for the ‘‘Holmes problem’’ that is based on Bayesian net-
works [66]. Jaeger uses the ﬁrst-order description of the ‘‘Holmes problem’’ to build
a Bayesian network for any given domain—that is, given a domain, Jaegers method
produces a Bayesian network. Take a domainVH containing G and H and such that
lG holds; in this case Jaegers method constructs the graph in Fig. 4. To do so,
Jaegers method assumes that
(1) all probability values are precisely known;
(2) P(avjlv,Bv,E) is a Noisy-OR function of Bv and E;
(3) Pðavj:lv;Bv;EÞ is independent of E.1 Inferences were computed with the JavaBayes system version 0.347, available under GPL from http://
www.pmr.poli.usp.br/ltd/Software/javabayes. This system contains a naive enumeration algorithm for
manipulation of sets of probabilities.
Fig. 4. The network for the ‘‘Holmes problem’’ with domain VH = {G,H} and assuming lG holds.
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ability values, or if there is disagreement about how to deﬁne the distribution
p(AvjLv,Bv,E). 2 In case these assumptions fail, a credal network can be used without
diﬃculties.
Take Fig. 4 and consider the following assessments, which attempt to translate the
rather vague scenario of the ‘‘Holmes problem’’:
(1) P(e) 2 [0.01,0.1].
(2) P(bv) 2 [0.001,0.01] for any v in the domain.
(3) P(lv) 2 [0.05,0.15] for any v in the domain.
(4) P ðavjlv; bv;:eÞ ¼ 0:9, P ðavjlv;:bv; eÞ ¼ 0:2, and P(avjlv,bv,e) P 0.9: that is, alarm
with burglary and earthquake is more probable than alarm with just burglary
when v lives in LA.
(5) P ðavjlv;:bv;:eÞ 2 ½0:0; 0:1	: that is, there is a ‘‘leak’’ probability between 0 and
0.1 that the alarm sounds even with no burglary and no earthquake when v lives
in LA.
(6) P ðavj:lv; bv; eÞ ¼ 0:9, Pðavj:lv; bv;:eÞ ¼ 0:9, P ðavj:lv;:bv; eÞ ¼ 0:0: and
P ðavj:lv;:bv;:eÞ ¼ 0:0: that is, probabilities are precise and do not depend on
E when v does not live in LA.
Suppose we take every possible combination of probability values within the indi-
cated bounds, and produce joint distributions using the Markov condition in the
graph of Fig. 4. We obtain P(aH) 2 [0.0001,0.0253], P(aHje) 2 [0.0108,0.0388],
P(aG) 2 [0.0029,0.1179] and P(aGje) 2 [0.2007,0.2080]. Note that inferences produce
rather small intervals; even though only a few assessments are used to build the cre-
dal network, the structural assumptions represented by the graph greatly constrain
probability values.
In this example a credal network is used to mix logical statements with ﬂexible
probabilistic assessments. An alternative way to combine logical and probabilistic
assessments would be to employ a probabilistic logic [47,58,59,72,77]. However, it
would be important to state assessments of independence as well—without such
assessments we cannot give meaning to the beautifully concise graphical representa-
tion in Fig. 4. We would then face the diﬃculty that the complexity of inference in2 The automatic resort to Noisy-OR functions is somewhat artiﬁcial, and it is characteristic of methods
that produce a single Bayesian network out of logical and probabilistic constructs [50,53,65,78,81].
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the complexity of independence-free probabilistic logic—and the latter is already
quite disheartening [72]. How could we then have a ﬂexible and compact language
to represent logical, probabilistic, and independence assessments? In short, we need
a language that is more ﬂexible than traditional probability theory, but more structured
than general probabilistic logic. Credal networks oﬀer one such balancing act.5. The theory of credal sets and credal networks
Before we analyze in further detail the properties of credal networks, we should
discuss a few deﬁnitions. A set of probability measures is called a credal set (from
Levis credal states [71]). There is some debate on whether credal sets should be
closed or open [88,102], and whether credal sets should be convex 3 or not [69,71].
In this paper a credal set can be closed or open, convex or non-convex.
A credal set deﬁned by probability distributions p(X) is denoted by K(X). Given a
credal set K(X) and a bounded function f(X), the upper and lower expectations
of f(X) are deﬁned respectively as E½f ðX Þ	 ¼ suppðX Þ2KðX ÞEp½f ðX Þ	 and E[f(X)] =
infp(X)2K(X)Ep[f(X)], where Ep[f(X)] indicates standard expectation. Upper and lower
probabilities are deﬁned similarly. A lower expectation can be viewed as an assess-
ment of the form Ep[f(X)] P E[f(X)] (that is, a linear constraint on the space of prob-
ability distributions for X). A credal set K and its convex hull produce the same
lower/upper expectations and lower/upper probabilities.
The most commonly adopted scheme for conditioning in credal sets is element-
wise Bayes rule (that is, conditioning is obtained by applying Bayes rule to each ele-
ment of a credal set). 4 Such an intuitive prescription, called the generalized Bayes
rule by Walley [102,103], can be justiﬁed axiomatically in various ways [51,56,102].
Note that if K(X) is convex, then K(XjA) is convex as well [71].
There are two diﬀerent ways to represent conditioning with respect to random
variables. First, consider the collection of separately speciﬁed conditional credal sets
{K(XjY = y) :y is a value of Y}. We denote this collection of credal sets by K(XjY).
Second, consider the direct speciﬁcation of a set of functions p(XjY); call such a set
an extensive conditional credal set, and denote it by L(XjY). It should be clear that
K(XjY) and L(XjY) are quite diﬀerent objects; the ﬁrst is a set of credal sets, and the
second is a single set of functions. 5 In the ﬁrst example in Section 4, K(LjI) is sep-
arately speciﬁed while L(EjA,B) is extensively speciﬁed.
A credal network consists of a directed acyclic graph, where each node in the
graph is associated with a random variable, and where each variable X is associated3 A credal set is convex if, for any measures P1 and P2 in the set, the measure aP1 + (1 
 a)P2 is in the
set for any a 2 [0,1].
4 Alternative schemes are discussed by Chrisman [22], Moral [75] and de Cooman and Zaﬀalon [42].
5 A note on terminology: Moral and Cano use the term conditioned to the values to indicate separately
speciﬁed credal sets (the latter term is used by Walley [102] and Cozman [31]), and use conditional set and
conditional information to indicate extensive conditional credal sets [76].
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‘‘local’’ credal sets into a set of joint distributions satisfying a Markov condition on
the graph. 6 To accomplish this, it is necessary to deﬁne: (1) what is the Markov con-
dition on the graph; (2) how to combine the local credal sets. The remainder of this
section discusses these points.
We start by discussing independence concepts in the context of credal sets. There
are at least two possibilities (to simplify the discussion, we assume that every event
has positive lower probability):
• First, we may require factorization for all distributions in the credal set (that is,
p(X,Y) = p(X)p(Y) for all distributions). Such a requirement implies non-convex-
ity of the credal set. To remain agnostic with respect to convexity, we may require
factorization just for the vertices of the credal set. We then say that X and Y are
strongly independent. Strong independence is the most commonly adopted concept
in the literature; variants of this concept were already implicit in Hubers work on
frequentist robustness [64] and in the ﬁrst proposals for credal networks [20,97].
• Second, we may require irrelevance of conditioning: we say that Y is epistemically
irrelevant to X if E[f(X)jY = y] = E[f(X)] for any bounded f(X) and any y. It turns
out that epistemic irrelevance is not symmetric—Y may be epistemically irrelevant
to X while X is not epistemically irrelevant to Y [102]. We say that X and Y are
epistemically independent if X is epistemically irrelevant to Y and Y is epistemically
irrelevant to X [102].
The literature contains a number of alternative deﬁnitions for independence
[26,33,41]; even though some uniﬁcation of concepts may be possible [32,76], it seems
unlikely that a single concept will become prevalent in all applications of credal sets.
Note that such concepts are often not equivalent; for example, strong independence
implies epistemic independence, but not the converse.
There are several ways to deﬁne conditional independence as well [76]. Say that X
and Y are strongly independent conditional on Z if the vertices of the credal set
K(X,YjZ = z) factorize for every z. And say that X and Y are epistemically indepen-
dent conditional on Z if E[f(X)jY = y,Z = z] = E[f(X)jZ = z] for any bounded func-
tion f(X) and any (y,z), and E[g(Y)jX = x,Z = z] = E[g(Y)jZ = z] for any bounded
function g(Y) and any (x,z).
Suppose we have a directed acyclic graph, random variables X1, . . . ,Xn, ‘‘local’’
credal sets (either separately or extensively speciﬁed), and we have settled on a con-
cept of independence. It seems reasonable to assume that every variable Xi associated
with the graph is independent of its non-descendant non-parents given its parents.
This is the Markov condition for credal networks—note that the condition depends
on the adopted concept of independence. We then have all ingredients of a credal6 Andersen and Hooker have discussed credal networks that combine local and non-local credal sets
[2]; the discussion here is restricted to networks containing only local sets. The advantage of using only
local sets is that it is always possible to satisfy the Markov condition discussed later; non-local sets may be
inconsistent with the Markov condition.
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decide how to build a set of joint distributions over X1, . . . ,Xn out of these
ingredients.
In general, there may be several sets of joint distributions that are consistent with
a given collection of marginal and conditional credal sets. Any one of these sets of
joint distributions is called an extension of the marginal and conditional credal sets.
Usually one is interested in the largest possible extension for a given set of assess-
ments (Walley refers to these extensions as ‘‘natural’’ ones [102]). For a credal net-
work, we might consider the largest extension satisfying the Markov condition as the
‘‘natural semantics’’ for the network. So we have:
(1) the largest extension that satisﬁes the Markov condition with respect to strong
independence—the strong extension;
(2) the largest extension that satisﬁes the Markov condition with respect to epistemic
independence—the epistemic extension.
Other extensions could be generated for a credal network, but the strong and the
epistemic extensions are the only ones that have received systematic attention so far
in the literature. 7 Strong extensions were already implicit in the ﬁrst proposals for
credal networks [20,97] and have received considerable attention [2,21,30,45,109].
Comparatively few results are known concerning epistemic extensions [31,35].
Given a credal network with local separately speciﬁed credal sets K(Xijpa(Xi)), the
strong extension of the network is the convex hull of the set containing all joint
distributions that factorize as
Y
i
pðX ijpaðX iÞÞ; ð1Þ
where the conditional distributions p(Xijpa(Xi) = pk) are selected from the local
credal sets K(Xijpa(Xi) = pk) [32]. If present, extensive conditional credal sets
L(Xijpa(Xi)) can be used in Expression (1): instead of selecting p(Xijpa(Xi) = pk) from
K(Xijpa(Xi) = pk), one would then select the function p(Xijpa(Xi)) from the set of
functions L(Xijpa(Xi)).
The examples discussed in Section 4 showed inferences computed with respect to
strong extensions of the networks.
Strong extensions are appropriate in a variety of contexts. In particular, strong
extensions are appropriate when one views a credal set as a black-box containing
the ‘‘true’’ probability measure [54]. Under this ‘‘sensitivity analysis’’ interpretation,
there is a Bayesian network hidden ‘‘inside’’ a credal network, and it makes sense to
restrict our attention to joint distributions that satisfy the Markov property for stan-
dard stochastic independence. Strong extensions are also appropriate when several
experts specifying a credal network disagree about probability values but agree that
every acceptable joint distribution should satisfy standard stochastic independence7 A note on terminology: Couso et al. employ the term independence in the selection to refer to strong
independence and reserve strong independence to the more speciﬁc case of strong extensions [26].
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display the same separation properties of standard Bayesian networks (that is, d-sep-
aration holds in strong extensions) [31]. A ﬁnal argument in favor of strong exten-
sions is that they are not exclusively dependent on strong independence; it is
possible to generate strong extensions from conditions involving only epistemic inde-
pendence [32].6. Inference and learning with strong extensions
Given a credal network, one may be interested in lower/upper probabilities or
expectations, or one may be interested in particular values of variables that ‘‘domi-
nate’’ other values according to some criterion. Often the term inference is used to
indicate the computation of lower/upper probabilities in some extension. In this case,
if Xq is a query variable and XE represents a set of observed variables, the inference is
the computation of tight bounds for p(XqjXE) for one or more values of Xq.
For inferences with strong extensions, it is known that the distributions that
minimize/maximize p(XqjXE) belong to the set of vertices of the extension [45]. 8
The diﬃculty faced by inference algorithms is the potentially enormous number
of vertices that a strong extension may have, even for small networks. For example,
take the network in Fig. 1, and assume that X, Y and Z have four values each, with
separately speciﬁed credal sets with four vertices each. There are then 49 potential
vertices of the strong extension (that is, 49 diﬀerent distributions following Expres-
sion (1)). The only credal networks that are amenable to eﬃcient exact inferences
are polytree-shaped networks with binary variables [45]. Other networks, even poly-
tree-shaped ones, face tremendous computational challenges [36]. Exact inference
algorithms typically examine potential vertices of the strong extension to produce
the required lower/upper values [15,21,31,36,37]. Approximate inference algorithms
can produce either outer or inner approximations: the former produce intervals that
enclose the correct probability interval between lower and upper probabilities
[19,38,57,97], while the latter produce intervals that are enclosed by the correct
probability interval [2,15,16,30]. Some of these algorithms emphasize enumeration
of vertices, while others resort to optimization techniques (as computation of
lower/upper values for p(XqjXE) is equivalent to minimization/maximization of a
fraction containing polynomials in probability values). Rather detailed overviews
of inference algorithms for imprecise probabilities have been published by Cano
and Moral [17,18].
Procedures that ‘‘learn’’ credal networks from data have been investigated in the
last decade. A few scenarios have been explored in the literature. The simplest situ-
ation is to learn a credal network for a given graph, using a complete database of
categorical variables and Imprecise Dirichlet priors [29,115]. Another scenario is8 This is valid when unobserved variables are assumed to be missing at random; if the ‘‘missingness
mechanism’’ is entirely unknown, comparisons between probabilities can often be produced eﬃciently
even for densely connected credal networks [42].
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data [84,110,112]. Finally, the most complex situation is to learn the graph and
the local credal sets from complete or missing data [14,110,114]—there is a great
lack of methods that learn general graphical structures directly from data. Most
of the eﬀort in learning credal networks has been so far directed to credal classiﬁca-
tion (that is, to use a credal network for classiﬁcation); in fact, some of the most suc-
cessful applications of credal networks have appeared in the context of credal
classiﬁcation [84,113]. Credal classiﬁcation diﬀers from Bayesian classiﬁcation in that
an observation may be labeled with a set of classes—all classes that are not domi-
nated by any other classes with respect to posterior probability. Thus credal classi-
ﬁcation requires more than just computation of minima and maxima of
probabilities; credal classiﬁcation requires that undominated classes be identiﬁed
through comparisons between classes. Classiﬁcation is an important topic for appli-
cation of credal networks, with a huge potential and still a great number of
challenges.7. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to present a broad overview of graphical models
for imprecise probabilities and a more detailed discussion of credal networks. Such
graphical models are quite ﬂexible in their representational power and yet are quite
compact and easy to construct. The theory of credal networks has received consi-
derable attention and is now reaching a reasonable degree of maturity.
Given the breadth of the ﬁeld, this overview is certain to have missed relevant
work on graphical models and imprecise probabilities. It is hoped that such omis-
sions are not many and can be forgiven. In any case, two topics should at least be
mentioned: graphical models for possibility measures, and graphical models that
handle zero lower probabilities. Both topics are important and raise a large number
of conceptual and technical problems; they were omitted for lack of space. A vast
literature on graphical models for possibility measures can be consulted [48]. With
regard to zero lower probabilities [25,102,105], there has been recent work on this
subject, and new concepts and algorithms have been proposed to handle such situ-
ations [100,101].
Many types of graphical models have been little explored, particularly models that
deal with decision-making. There have also been few available software packages for
manipulation of graphical models with imprecise probabilities. There is certainly no
shortage of potential contributions to be made regarding graphical models for
imprecise probabilities.Acknowledgment
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